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Book Review
Is There a Caring Crisis?
The Feminine Economy and Economic Man : Reviving the Role of the
Family in the Postindustrial Age, Shirley P. Burggraf. Reading, MA:
Perseus Books, 1999 (2d ed.). Pp. 271. $15.00.
AmyL. \Vaxt

Introduction
Economist Shirley Burggrafs book The Feminine Econorny and
Economic Man claims that a crisis confronts Western Civilization: we are
investing too little in the next generation. 1 A fundamental premise of
Burggrafs analysis is that an ample supply of resources for children is
central and indispensable to the maintenance of a good society. 2 Although
Burggraf gives some attention to public or collective investments in
children (most notably public education), her principal concern is the
private resources that parents devote to their own children. She attaches
special importance to parents' personal attention and suggests that there
looms a shortage of the kind of direct, hands-on care that parents, and
especially mothers, have customarily supplied within the family and
outside the market economy. 3 An undersupply of parental nurture threatens
to undermine children's chances of growing up to become worthy and
productive adults, with negative consequences for those children and for
4
society as a whole.
If a shortfall in parental investment in children indeed confronts us at
the dawn of the twenty-first century, what is the solution? Although
Burggraf recommends a menu of measures for strengthening the family
and improving education, she puts a great deal of faith in one item in
particular: an intriguing but impractical proposal for reforming Social
Security.5 She suggests that the existing program be scrapped in favor of
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one that incorporates a "parental dividend." 6 Her proposal would introduce
three key changes in the program's structure. First, although her old-age
pension scheme would be publicly mandated and administered, each
person's retirement fund would be maintained separately. 7 The proposal
would thus eliminate the current elements of pooling and redistribution
among beneficiaries at different income levels. 8 Second, the money in the
fund used to support a beneficiary's retirement would come from a tax on
the income of a beneficiary's own children. 9 A person's entitlement to
benefits from a private fund would therefore depend on the beneficiary
having children of his or her own. Finally, the amount available to fund a
person's old age would depend on how much that person's offspring paid
into the fund. That amount would in tum depend on the children's duration
of employment and level of earnings-that is on their success in the
10
marketplace for labor.
Hmv does Burggraf negotiate the distance between her theory of a
nurture shortage and her proposal to overhaul a beloved, but beleaguered
11
social program along the lines of the parental dividend? Finessing this
link requires Burggrafs book to be about much more than old-age pension
programs and to cover a great deal more ground than the usual brief for
Social Security reform. In 200 pages, Burggraf puts forward a host of
propositions based on a dizzying array of assumptions about history,
psychology, ideology, child development, the nature of the feminist
revolution, social evolution, and people's responses to economic
incentives.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of Burggrafs tour through these
topics is her methodology. Burggraf is an economist. In an attempt to
construct a reasonably rigorous framework within which to preach to the
unconverted, Burggraf employs the basic tools of economic analysis with
mixed success. She assumes, controversially, that private and emotional1y

6
See irl. at 69-81. As currently structured, Social Security is funded through taxes on
wages and maintains no pretense of actuarial soundness. It is a pay-as-you-go scheme that depends on
taxes levied on the working population to fund outlays to retirees. A continuous supply of taxpaying
productive workers is essential to keep the system afloat. For a description of the nuts and bolts of
Social Security, see SARA. LEVITAN ET AL., PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR (7th ed. I998).
See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 69.
7
8
On the redistributive element in Social Security, see MI1v1f ABRAMOWITZ, REGULATING
THE LIVES OF WOMEN 249 (1988). Although Burggraf states that "the parental dividend docs not
preclude a safety net," she would reserve mandatory old-age investments for parents alone.
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freighted human functions like childrearing, which are traditionally
performed within families, can fruitfully be analyzed using this approach.
The burgeoning field of the economics of the family demonstrates that
there is a respectable pedigree for this application of the methods of
12
economics and Burggrafs book is very much in keeping with this body
of work. Nevertheless, Burggraf s analysis shares many of the defects
inherent in trying to apply economic concepts designed primarily to deal
with market phenomena to the messy and mysterious realms of family life
and intimate relations.
Ultimately, however, the book's principal failing lies not in the
inadequacy of the method but in the dubious premises that the author is
willing to accept. In particular, her suggestion that her proposed pension
system reforms will significantly increase investments in children
necessarily rests on assuming that the current structure of Social Security
is the principal cause of any putative underinvestment in children. But if
children are receiving too little of society's time or attention, the most
important causes almost surely lie elsewhere. And not only is the parental
dividend no cure for those maladies, but it can be expected to introduce
fresh difficulties that are as likely to worsen as to improve the welfare of
future generations. Thus, although Burggraf takes us on a lively and
exhilarating ride, in the end she fails to make out her case for the parental
dividend because she leaves out too much, assumes too much, and ignores
too many potential perverse consequences and practical difficulties. But as
with many bold proposals that will never see the light of day, Burggrafs
scheme nonetheless advances our understanding by testing our
assumptions and forcing us to confront some of our current public welfare
dilemmas.
I.

Burggrafs Parental Dividend Proposal

Burggrafs argument rests on the assumption that bearing and raising
children can be viewed as a form of parental investment. This makes
economic sense: children require the expenditure of large quantities of
time and money, both of which have undeniable economic value.
Economists recognize that children have a dual aspect: they provide
13
satisfaction or "consumption" for parents, but they also represent human
12
See generally G ARY S. BECKER, TR EATI SE ON THE FAM IL Y ( 1991 ); NANC Y R. FOLBRE,
WHO PAYS FOR TH E KJDS? (1994); ECONOM ICS OF THE FAMIL Y: i'v!ARRJAGE, C HILDREN, AN D H UM,.\N
CA PIT,.\L (Theodore W. Schul tz ed , 1974).
13
See. e.g., BECK ER, supra note 12, M ARC NERLOVE ET AL ., HOUS EHOLD AN D ECONOMY:
WELFA RE ECONOM IES OF EN DOGENOUS FERTI LITY ( 1987); Ro l f George, On 1/ze Extemal Benejils uf
Children , in 1<.1:-\DRED M.-\TTERS: RETH INK ING THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE FAM ILY 209, 209-17 (DT
iV!cyer·s et a\. eds , 1987) (desc rib ing ho w ec o nomists have mode led chil dren pr i m arily as :~
co nsumpt ion good). The fact that child re ari ng generates a blend of consu mpt ion va l ue and othe r
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capital, which in tum can produce goods, services, and other forms of
wealth. 14 That children bring pleasure and satisfaction to their parents does
not make the idea of children as an investment less valid or less
heuristically important. On the simplest model, therefore, children serve as
a kind of black box into which parents and others pour valuable resources
in the hope and expectation that those investments will yield valuable
returns.
The economic model of parental investment must assume
discoverable relationships between inputs and outputs. Different children
grow up possessing various amounts of human capital, which presumably
reflect in some regular and systematic way the amount and quality of the
inputs invested in them. That human capital is then put to work generating
payoffs in various contexts, including the labor market. For Burggraf, the
trouble with current arrangements lies in the relationship between inputs
and payoffs from childrearing. In our private enterprise system, she argues,
parents make the lion's share of investments in future generations, but they
do not receive a fair return on their efforts because the gains from
enhanced human capital do not redound entirely or even predominantly to
the parents who bear the costs of creating it. 15 Rather, a large part of those
gains are externalized or realized by others. 16 Because parents are
economically rational, their investment decisions, including the amount
and quality of care that they provide, will be influenced to a significant
extent by some balance of the monetary costs and expected returns from
raising children. If payoffs are shunted elsewhere, that balance will be
thrown off and investments will decline.
In her attempt to identify the beneficiaries of the gains in human
capital generated by investments in childrearing, Burggraf focuses almost
exclusively on children's future value as workers. That is where Social
Security enters the picture. The taxes workers pay to support any
mandatory old-age pension system represent the returns on the investment
that these workers' parents made in their children's future productivity.
Burggraf's argument runs something like this: because Social Security has
long since ceased to be an actuarially sound insurance program, its
continued viability depends on the collective support of the generation of
workers who are paying into the Social Security fund. Those revenues in
tum depend on the offspring's efforts and productivity, which generate a
returns confounds public policy approaches to child development. Since different types of payoffs
from child welfare are hard to separate, it is not easy to design policies that produce public benefit
without generating signitlc:lllt "rents" for private gain. See AmyL Wax, Rearing the Next Generation:
A View from the Economics of Public Finance (unpublished manuscript, on tile with author).
\4
See George, supra note \J (just because childr-en are consumer durables does not mean
they cannot be productive capital assets as well).
15
See BURGGR.-\F, supra note I, at 51 -66.
16
See id. at 54-66.
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base for taxation to support the payment of benefits to the parents '
generation. But those offspring were produced through the investments of
individual parents in the recipient group. The rub is that some of the
beneficiaries invested more than others, but entitlement to returns is tied to
work record rather than investment. People who never had children, or
whose children are not productive, can count on the collective support of
other people's offspring. This amounts to a subsidy flowing from parents,
and especially "good" parents, to nonparents, or "bad" parents, within the
17
same age cohort. According to Burggraf, this structure creates a clear
disincentive to good parenting on the part of beneficiaries of an old-age
pension system .
Burggraf does distinguish between two potential structural effects of
an old-age pension program. First, it might have antinatalist effects by
discouraging people from bearing children at all or inducing them to have
fewer. The simple prediction is that Social Security will depress fertility by
enhancing the potential to free ride on others' reproductive efforts.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of this effect would almost certainly depend
on particular social, cultural, and historical conditions such as the ability to
control fertility and the acceptance of childbearing as a choice . It has been
suggested that the structure of the pension system may not significantly
influence birth rates in western industrial societies because fertility rates
18
have already bottomed out for other reasons. If this suggestion is correct,
then perhaps Burggraf is right to devote little attention to anti-natalist
effects. 19 If it is wrong-that is, if the old-age system does have a
significant negative effect on fertility rates- then that consequence is
something to be reckoned with, since it will only exaggerate the trend
towards the production of fewer future workers to support a large aging
population, which is a formula for the system's eventual collapse.
On the first point, Burggraf's consistent emphasis on the productive
value of children will strike many as presenting a distorted picture of the
wellsprings of ordinary people ' s decisions to bear and rear children.
Burggraf acknowledges that parents ' intrinsic and vicarious interest in
their children ' s well-being, represented in the economics lexicon as
parents ' consumption value, will provide an important brake on wholesale
parental shirking. But her schema make s little sense unless investment
17
See id at 95-98.
18
There is some support fo r the conc lusion tha t Socia l Sec urity has mini ma l anti-natali st
etl ects in highl y deve loped industri al soc ieti es that have un dergone a dras ti c demograp hic transiti on.
See, e.g., Isaac Erli ch & Francis T. Liu , Social Security, The Family, and Eco nomic Growth, 36 ECO N.
IN QU IRY 390, 404 (\ 998) (statin g the expectati on of "little adverse effects [of soc iali ze d old-age
pens ion schemes) on fe rti lity or even sav ings at an advanc ed stage of deve lopment . .. where fertilit y
is quite low, so the ma in effect the n wou ld be on human cap ita l accumulatio n and growth").
19
See BURGGRA F, supra note I, at 73 -74 (s pec ulat ing that the po pu la ti on effec ts wou ld be
rather small).
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value tends to swamp consumption value in parents' reproductive calculus.
Only then can an intervention designed to increase returns on the
investment component of childrearing be expected to make a significant
difference to behavior. Whether Burggrafs critical assumption holds,
however, is anyone's guess. Burggraf s assessment of the balance of
consumption and concrete investment returns seems to rest primarily on
history and past social practice rather than on current social reality or
empirical social science data. Before the creation of modem, centralized,
mandatory pension programs, children were regarded as parents' major
0
source of old-age security? Burggraf reasons backwards that, because
such security was of great value to parents, the fear of being left without
children ' s support in old age must have strongly motivated parental
21
investment in children. But this reasoning fails to satisfy, and we are still
left wondering whether consumption or investment concerns (or perhaps
something else entirely) loom largest in most parents' motivational
structure, whether now or in the past. Even if parents used to depend on
their children routinely for old-age security and support, the role of that
dependence in setting parental levels of investment might still have been
negligible for any number of reasons. Perhaps parents in the past were
more skeptical about the existence of any important cause and effect
relationship between parental investment choices and children's
willingness or ability to support them in old age. Alternatively, parental
conduct may have been determined by conventions, understandings, or
individual parental characteristics that in most instances resisted important
individual variation due to narrowly self-seeking motives.
Cultural and historical evidence suggests that, at least under some
circumstances, intergenerational expectations can significantly influence
parental conduct. For example, there appears to be a connection in some
societies--China and India come to mind-between the value placed on
male offspring and sons' responsibility for their parents in old age.
Although these observations provide cautious support for the view that
relieving aging parents of reliance on their own children might potentially
cause parents to neglect them, much more is needed to show whether, and
to what extent, eliminating socialized old age support would alter parents '
behavioral choices in modem Western societies today. In particular, it
must not be forgotten that myriad alternative options for investing against
future destitution and bad luck are available to ordinary citizens in the
industrial west--options that are often out of reach in societies whose
20
See M IMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGU LATING THE Li VES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLI CY
FROM COLON IAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 244 ( 1996) (recounting statist ics suggesting that, prior to the
enactment of the Socia l Security Act, a majority of the elderl y depended on rel atives and friends for
support).
21
See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 65-66.
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customs are adduced to support the link between old age security and
parental indulgence. Throwing parents back on the tender mercies of their
adult children in societies with advanced financial markets might have the
perverse effect of deflecting resources away from childrearing towards
other sources of security.
Considerations of timing alone raise doubts about Burggrafs
suggestion that the Social Security program has depressed parental
investment in children, confounding the notion that the old-age pension
structure significantly affects parental investment patterns. Although
Social Security has been around since the 1930s, most of the rather cursory
evidence of declining child well-being that Burggraf musters for the
proposition that familial investment in children has fallen below desirable
levels long postdates the creation of the Social Security program. Burggraf
must explain why the effects that she attributes to the perverse behavioral
incentives of a mandatory old-age benefit system have only recently been
felt. 22
A second defect in the book's approach lies in Burggrafs failure to
distinguish consistently between different kinds of investment in children.
At some points she appears to focus quite narrowly on hands-on, direct
caretaking or "time with children," and even more specifically on parental
or maternal time with children. At others, she includes those items of
value (i.e. , private schooling or access to good public schools, private
lessons, travel, safe neighborhoods, paid childcare services) that depend
largely on family, community, or government expenditures. Although
Burggraf does discuss public investment in children, such as spending on
education, 23 on balance she tends to stress private, nongovernmental
inputs. But her private world of childrearing is curiously impoverished:
she tends to give short shrift to the nonparental or nonfamilial forms of
attention-from relatives, neighbors, community leaders, and religious
figures-and the structures that support the generous, routine provision of
such attention, which may well be quite crucial to childrens' development.
In any event, is unclear from her discussion whether she believes that the
most critical shortfall lies in the provision of hands-on parental caretaking,
in the falloff in other forms of private investment, or in a decline in
government spending. And she provides little information from which to
determine where additional inputs should be concentrated and what mix of
investments would be best. Finally, as a result of her confusion about what
she means by investments in children, she does not carefully enough
unpack the myriad factors-political, economic, cultural, and
psychological-that differentially determine the amount and quality of

22
23

See BURGG RAF, suprnnote l,at212-13.
See id at I 02.
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investments in children over the broad public-private spectrum.
Burggraf devotes a good portion of the book to a feminist cri de coeur
against what she claims is a longstanding disdain for and undervaluation of
traditional, feminine caretaking work, and she offers some theories as to
why that role has not been valued at its true worth. 24 Her extended
discussion of the history and ideology of women's work reinforces the
reader's sense that her main preoccupation is with a supposed
underprovision of direct parental attention to children and perhaps even
more narrowly with a dearth of maternal care. Burggraf appears to believe
that her commitment to enhancing maternal time with children leads to the
conclusion that Social Security must be reformed along the lines she
proposes. The discussion below suggests why that conclusion does not
follow from her premises. But even apart from that defect in her logic,
Burggrafs stress on maternal care for children distorts her attempt to
figure out what is happening to child well-being overall. Although
unquestionably of great importance, traditional mothering is but one form
of familial investment in children. Much evidence suggests that more
general paternal attention, or at least paternal presence, is also important. 25
Moreover, direct care is only one kind of parental resource. Families have
always made significant financial investments in children in the form of
things money can buy, and those have traditionally had little to do with the
mother's role precisely because mothers historically earned very little.
That portion of parental investment can be traced to resources coming
from the breadwinner (usually the father) and to decisions, in which
fathers presumably participate, about how much money to spend on
children. But those decisions have little to do, at least directly, with the
peculiarities of the economy's treatment of or attitudes towards women's
work. If families are spending too little money on their children, or are
misdirecting the resources they have, the explanations for that behavior
may differ from the reasons for any supposed undersupply of maternal
care. For example, in order to spend the money of a breadwinner, there
needs to be a breadwinner on the premises. Burggraf does give some
attention to family breakdown and paternal absence as one culprit in a
decline in investments in children. 26 But the potentially great importance
of paternal inputs in the form of time, money, and family stability suggests
that the structural undervaluation of women's efforts, contrary to
Burggrafs implication, may be only a small part of the story she seeks to

24
See id. at 15-35.
25
Indeed, Burgrraf herse lf appears to acknow ledge the problem of the lack of pa te rnal ca re.
Cf id. at 7 (c iting fo rmer Vice Presi dent Dan Quayle's speech critic izin g the telev ision show Murphy
Brown's glorification of single motherhood , and ac kn owledgi ng that many share hi s conce rns); id. at
I 09-44 (offerin g proposals to strengthen the institution o f m~miage).
26
See id. at I09-44.
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tell.
The lack of a theory of the relative importance of different forms of
inputs into child well-being connects with the third defect in Burggrafs
discussion: her failure to define the conditions that establish a baseline of
optimal investments in children. Any claim of an undesirable shortfall
depends on comparing the existing supply to an ideal level of investment
in children generally and parental caretaking services in particular. But
how do we know what the right amount would be? This question lurks in
the background of Burggrafs discussion but does not receive a satisfying
or systematic analysis. Because Burggraf never identifies the prerequisites
to the optimal supply of resources to children, she is in danger of going
astray in her analysis of how to arrange private and public life to insure
that support will be forthcoming from the right quarters.
On standard economic accounts, an optimal level of supply of a good
or service is the level that would result from the intersection of supply and
demand in a perfectly competitive market. That market will ideally
produce an outcome that maximizes social utility. Burggraf should
recognize that any attempt to identify the optimal level of supply of any
good or service- or any deviation from that level-creates a stark choice:
either an unregulated market will provide the efficient amount of services,
or the market will fail to do so for reasons of market failure, in which case
a regulatory intervention or "fix" may be necessary. Rephrasing this
question with respect to Burggrafs scheme, the alternatives are: either the
free market produces the optimal level of childrearing or it does not.
Burggraf is fundamentally confused about the strengths and
shortcomings of markets in producing a desirable level of parental
investment within society as a whole. Burggraf implies that insufficient
attention to children's needs is the product of a Social Security system that
separates the costs and benefits of childrearing as it operates in
combination with a background market distortion in the form of a
culturally mandated undervaluation of women ' s efforts. But that picture
sits uneasiiy with her insistence that the crisis of parental investment has
worsened recently, because the customary undervaluation of women's
work is, if anything, under greater discipliniary pressure from competitive
market forces now than ever before. Her diagnosis is also inconsistent
with her own discussion of broader social and economic developments.
Thus, she stresses the dramatic rise in the costs of raising and educating
children. 27 And she recognizes that skyrocketing costs can be traced in
large part to the growing opporv. mity costs of childrearing, which have
almost everything to do with women's changing roles and brighter

27

See /d.
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prospects in, the workplace. To the extent that Burgraffs analysis rests on
an understanding that these developments exaggerate the disparity between
parental investments and payoffs by increasing the costs of inputs, it is at
odds with her diagnosis of our dilemma as traceable to a central defect in
the existing Social Security system, which is that it depresses parental
returns.
Indeed, the historical and social developments Burggraf documents
before proceeding to her reform proposal are largely independent of the
pension system, and would continue unabated even if Social Security were
altered or abolished. Burggrafs story is also inconsistent with her
emphasis on attaching a higher value to women's work. The labor market
developments she describes are associated with more rather than less
transactional freedom, which can be expected to produce an economically
more rational pricing of women's labor. The move towards a free market
in women's labor is fundamentally inconsistent with a culturally
conditioned or customary understatement of its value. Yet Burggraf cannot
have it both ways. She cannot blame the neglect of children on the legacy
of the "gender cartel" that fails to reward women's labor at its true worth,
while at the same time tracing this development back to women's progress
on the labor market, which involves the dissolution of that cartel.
In the same vein, Burggraf also takes note of the evolution of sexual
mores and the loosening of marital ties. She fails to see that changes in
sexual norms generate a significant opportunity cost of their own,
analogous to that created by women's expanding options in the workplace.
Just as broader marketplace opportunities for women can be viewed as
raising the effective price of traditional time-intensive caretaking,
loosening sexual mores can be viewed as expanding sexual opportunities
for both parents, but especially for men. This raises the effective pricetag
on paternal long-term devotion to children and thus makes paternal
presence and breadwinner investments more costly.
Although Burggraf recognizes these trends and discerns some of their
implications, she fails fully to comprehend that the social dynamic that
results from women's greater participation in paid work and from evolving
sexual norms implies a conclusion that undermines her focus on Social
Security reform. Specifically, the transition towards a less regulated
market both in labor and sexual alliances may itself be responsible for a
sequence of events that generates less than optimal investment in children.
How exactly would the transition to more transactional freedom in
occupational and sexual choice produce the dislocations Burggraf claims?
One possibility is to admit that children's well-being has indeed declined,
but to assert that countervailing gains in other quarters have arguably
28
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produced an increase in net social welfare overall. Greater occupational
freedom for women, for example, would create new opportunities for
utility-enhancing transactions on the labor market, which were effectively
blocked prior to the feminist revolution. 29 Absent a complicated story,
implicating collective effects, to show why such changes might move
society to a less favorable equilibrium, the utility generated through more
spontaneous voluntary exchange would be expected to increase social
welfare. Greater sexual freedom might also spell more personal happiness ,
with a similar effect. The idea that such tradeoffs might actually occur is
discomfitting for a number of reasons. First, the suggestion is doubly
problematic in expressly inviting interpersonal comparisons of utility on
sharply different measures of personal and social welfare and in employing
elements of well-being that are especially difficult to quantify. Second, the
candid identification of winners and losers rests on the notion that
children's well-being might be in significant tension with that of adults
and even of women-a notion frequently resisted because of the hard,
value-laden choices it demands.
It is possible that changes in recent years have produced the best of all
possible worlds; however, it is also possible that gains have not been
sufficiently large to offset the effects of any putative falloffs in the level of
resources channeled to children under the old social strictures. If so, that
invites an analysis of why social arrangements have evolved to provide
neither for greater well-being for children nor greater social happiness
overall. As the discussion below explains more fully, one possibility is that
the labor market and socio-sexual changes associated with greater freedom
of choice do not, despite appearances, represent a move to more efficient
markets, but rather towards a form of market failure that reduces social
well-being in the aggregate. If that is the case, then the Social Security
system may have less to do with our current predicament than Burggraf
suggests, and her proposal for revamping that system less to do with the
solution than she might hope.
II.

An Undersuppl y of Parental Care- What Is the Explanation?

Burggraf s work attempts to connect two complicated social
phenomena: first, that parents frequently do not receive a fair return on
30
their investment in their children; and second, that "women's work" in
the home has historically been undercompensated and undervalued. 31 In

29
For a disc uss ion of thi s and other themes conce rn ing wo men in the wo rkpl ace , sec
geno:: rally Amy L. Wax , Caring Enough: Sex Roles. Work, and Tfn ing Wom en, 44 Y !LL L. REv.
(forthcoming 1999).
30
See BURGGRAF, supm no te I , at 94-98 .
31
See id. ot 43-50
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focusing on parents ' inadequate returns, she must answer the question of
who is receiving the lion 's share of the returns. Her background account
should lead to the conclusion that childrearing potentially generates
important baseline public goods and positive externalities,32 wholly apart
from and prior to any governmentally mandated system of old-age support.
Yet Burggraf never expressly confronts this possibility, choosing instead
to emphasize the positive externalities generated by the old-age pension
system.
Burggrafs failure to link her observations about inadequate parental
returns on investment to a larger theory of how market forces operate in
the spheres relevant to childrearing investments leads her to look in the
wrong places for explanations of why women's traditional activities have
historically been undercompensated and denigrated. At times, she appears
to blame ideology, arguing that those in power, including theorists of
various stripes and self-interested males in general, have persuaded
themselves that women ' s work is not worth much. 33 At other times, she
blames the fact that most women's work is performed within families, in
an off-market, unpriced setting. Because there is no real market for these
vital services, she suggests, it is easy for societies to discount them,
thereby fueling social and political theories that take women's work for
granted or leave it out of the picture entirely. 34 Yet neither of these stories
quite hangs together. As the following discussion suggests, there is an
alternative account that offers a better explanation for Burggrafs picture
of social reality. Unfortunately, that account also leads to the conclusion
that Burggrafs proposed solutions-and her Social Security reform
scheme in particular-will do little to correct the trends that she finds most
troubling.
A.

Free Markets in Wom en's Labor and Externalities of Childrearing

Time spent caring for children cannot be spent earning money or
consuming leisure activities. This much has always been true. Within the
past thirty years or so, however, women have enjoyed a dramatically
broader range of lucrative opportunities on the labor market. The causes of
this expansion are unimportant for our purposes. The point is that large
32
Burggraf assoc iates the idea of children as public goods with Nancy Folbre. See id. at 8385 . She nonetheless curiously di smisses public polic y recommendations based on Folbre's model as
imprac ti ca l and th us not wo rth y of we igh ty conside ration. She also seems to confuse the noti on that
efti cien t allocation req uires that chil dreari ng cos ts be socialized (i.e. , borne by the me mbers of the
publ ic who enjoy the be ne ti ts) with proposals to transfer di rec t chi ld reari ng work out of pri va te ha nds.
See id. at 84-85. But the first idea , which entai ls on ly some form of public subsidy or support, does no t
necessarily entai l the other, whic h goes to the organ iza ti on of carc giving.
33
See id at 39-4 1, 182 -83.
34
See id. at 188-90.
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numbers of women have for the first time been permitted to engage in
activities and to occupy social roles formerly reserved for men. 35
These changes were made possible and considerably hastened by the
creation of modem labor markets. According to the neoclassical account,
returns to labor are in large part determined by supply and demand. 36 A
given quantity of labor is rewarded at a particular price or wage that
reflects its economic value. The economic value reflects demand on the
market as well as labor productivity, which is a function of ability,
industry, and training. Until recently, the market for men's labor, although
always far from perfectly competitive, was considerably more "free" and
rational (that is, responsive to workers' actual economic productivity) than
the market for women's work. Indeed, until very recently no society has
seen fit to release women onto the labor market to compete alongside men
by selling their labor to the highest bidder on approximately equal terms.
Rather, equal employment opportunity by sex was rejected, in theory and
practice, by virtually every society worldwide.
Various formal and informal strategies were traditionally employed to
limit women's labor market currency. 37 In this century at least, informal
customs or norms surely have been more important than law as the source
of restrictions on the labor market choices of women. Burggraf accurately
calls these restrictions a "caste system. "38 The disapproval that label
implies, however, blinds Burggraf to the functions performed by social
norms in general and the norms and practices that comprise the gender
caste system in particular. Traditional gender role norms are a
comprehensive system of social regulation designed to restrict the
transactions into which individuals might otherwise freely enter if
motivated purely by self-interest. 39 Burggraf never stops to consider the
dynamic behind the nearly universal phenomenon of distinct gender roles.
Why have societies worldwide and throughout history adopted a set of
35
I develop the ideas in this section in greater detail in Wax, supra note 31.
36
See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Careers and Contingency, 51 STAN. L. REV. 73, 91-93, 131-38
(1998) (describing neoclassical labor market models and critiques of those models).
37
See, e.g., SUSAN PEDERSEN, FAMILY DEPENDENCE AND THE 0RJGJNS OF THE WELFARE
STATE: 8RJTAIN AND FRANCE 1914-1945 ( 1993) (otTering a historical perspective); Mary Anne Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Male in the Law and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. I (1995) (discussing sex role conventions). In modem times,
the most important devices have been informal customs that either make some work unavailable to
women or make performing it less economically rewarding for them. It was simply understood that
some jobs belonged to or suited men, and that women should not be hired to perform them. Men would
not permit their wives to work after marriage; to have a working wife was considered a source of
shame. For a man to work under a female boss was considered unthinkably degrading. Women were
routinely paid less than men for the same work. All these conventions were widely accepted and rarely
questioned or de tied. See generally Wax, supra note 31; Wax, supra note 13.
3S
Sec BURGGRAF, supra note I , at 3-4.
39
For a more extended discussion , see Wax, supra note 31; Wax, supra note 13. On norms
gc:nnally, sc:c: Richard li McAdams. The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 338 (1992) .
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social mores and customs that reject a laissez fa ire approach to women's
productive efforts and tightly restrict the sphere of women's legitimate
social activities? Why have societies also uniformly frowned on the very
notion of a free market in women 's work?
One answer is presented by the defects that economists have
identified as commonly accepted sources of market failure . Among the
traditionally recognized conditions for market failure are the creation of
public goods and the generation of positive or negative externalities. 40
Thus, if Burggraf is right that there is currently a suboptimal
underprovision of hands-on parenting, then a theory of positive
externalities and public goods may explain it.
It is commonly accepted that imperfectly compet1t1ve markets can
result when activities generate negative externalities. 41 If services
traditionally supplied by women , most notably the direct care of children,
tend to generate significant positive externalities, one would expect these
services to be undersupplied in an otherwise unregulated market for
women's labor. Specifically, externalities might systematically distort the
demand for women's labor on the paid market and at home and alter the
balance between the two sectors . This shift rather idealistically assumes
that women's labor on the paid market is priced at its full value; that there
are no other factors such as discrimination or market norms distorting the
42
market price. The uncompensated benefit from nurturing work would
40
See infra note 24.
41
See, e.g., FRANCISCO CABRILLO, THE ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY AND FAMILY POLICY
146-54 ( 1999); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLI C CHOICE II 25-2 8 ( 1990); NERLOVE, ET AL. , supra note
13 , at 37 -43. Publi c finance theory predicts that, when investments or transactions create negative
externalities, that is, when they impose costs on third parties, the market will generate too much of a
commodity or service at the price fix ed by the market. Only if the true costs of the activity are
internali zed to the transaction will the pa1ties gene rate the optimal amount. Likewise, when an activity
generates posit ive externalities , that is, when it creates benefits for strangers to the transaction or
otherwise impedes fair compensation fo r the producer, the market will generate too little of the
commod ity or serv ice. Speci fic al ly, the theory predicts that producti ve labor that creates positive
externalities wi ll be undersupplied relative to some socially optimal output. In more prac tical terms,
workers whose labor generates positive externalities will tend to reduce their amount of effort because
the returns they enjoy will fai l to refl ect the full measure of its social val ue. People other than the
supplier will obta in some of those benefits gratui tously-they wi ll free ride on the transaction. The
returns to the worker wi ll be artificially depressed relative to what a perfectly competitive market
would generate.
42
Thi s acco unt is not meant to rul e out additional forc es that might lower returns to
women's work within the domestic sphere. The dynamics of bargaining between couples within the
marital relationship, which can be modeled as a bilateral monopol y, can affect wome n's returns on
investments within the family and could potential ly compound (or compensate for) the shortfall in
returns created by the interplay of the domestic and paid work sphere. There is reason to believe,
howeve r, that marriage introd uces severe impediments on women's abili ty to receive a fair return on
their labor outs ide the paid workplace and thus may reduce the rewards of domestic activity eve n
further in many cases. See Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in che Shadow of che Markee: Is There a Fwure
for Egalitarian Marriage 7 , 84 VA. L. REV. 509 ( 1998). The difficulty of predicting the outcomes of
the dynamics of intrafami li al allocations adds complexity to the interpl ay between the marital unit and
external markets for labor and confounds any attempt to analyze tradeoffs between parenting time and
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then artificially depress effective demand for those services relative to the
equilibrium demand for other uses of women ' s time. The reduction in
effective demand for caring work would diminish the rewards to those
performing such tasks and hence depress the supply of those willing to
perform the services. This would shift the overall balance of effort away
from nurturing. If women get significantly more accurate returns on
investment in the paid labor market, participation in the domestic sphere
will decline.
A number of theorists have suggested that unpaid, off-market
childrearing work potentially creates positive externalities of various
kinds. 43 It is quite difficult to detennine the exact nature of these benefits
and whether the magnitude of these externalities is significant enough to
44
influence behavior.
Nonetheless, two basic intuitions support the
conclusion that childrearing produces important generalized social
benefits. First, the continued existence of society in any form requires that
some number of children be born and raised to maturity. Although many
complex factors, perhaps including the structure of any old-age pension
program, might affect how many children a given society would be best off
producing, there is no question that everyone gains if some people take on
the parental role. Second, society as a whole is better off if children who
are born grow up to be industrious, law abiding, sober, moral, mentally
and physically healthy, conscientious, creative, educated, and skilled
citizens. Assuming for the sake of argument that the resources that parents
invest in childrearing have some important relationship to how children
tum out, then there is collective interest in the incentives parents face for
good or ill in the performance of their childrearing duties.
Yet another type of externality generated by childrearing potentially
shifts the allocation of parents' resources in general and the allocation of
women ' s labor in particular. The human capital generated by parental
investment redounds not only to the collective benefit of society as a
whole but also to the benefit of the individual children. Although parents
have a considerable interest in their children's well-being-as represented
by parental "consumption value"-there is still less than a complete
identity of interests. If some resources conferred on children by parents are
pure gift because parents receive no compensation in the form of
consumption value or otherwise, economic theory predicts that those
resources will be underprovided relative to some optimal amount.
My immediate concern is not to speculate on how to solve the
time devoted to paid work.
43
See. e.g., CABRILLO , supra note 43 ; NERLOV E, supra note 13 ; ERJC RA KOWSKI, EQUAL
JUSTICE 149 -55 ( 199 1) ; SCHULZ , supra note 12; Shirle y P. Burggraf, Ho w Should the Costs of Child
Rearing Be Distributed?, C HALLENGE, Sept .-Oct. 199 3, at 48-55; George, supra note 13.
44
For m ore on thi s topi c, see Wax, supra note 13.
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problems of positive externalities and market failure that potentially
deform the supply of good care for children. Rather, it is to posit a
relationship between these imperfections and the devices that societies
have historically evolved to deal with them. As noted, the theory of
externalities predicts that hands-on nurturing of children will be
undersupplied relative to some socially optimal level. But that undersupply
will only occur in a market that, apart from the noted defects, is otherwise
economically competitive, permitting women's labor on behalf of children
to compete without interference with other valuable uses of women's time,
including most notably paid market work. But one way to deal with
undersupply is to reduce the level of competition for women's time and
45
effort by reducing the returns to alternative allocations of labor. The
types of devices societies have employed to accomplish this result have
been rehearsed elsewhere. The effect of these devices will be to depress
the demand for women's paid labor overall, thus lowering the price, or
wage, on women's labor performed for pay, which depresses returns to
women workers from market work. If compensation from paid work is
artificially reduced, women will supply less of it relative to the
alternatives, which include domestic activities.
If this story is accepted, the gender caste system that Burggraf
deplores should be seen in a different light. The customs and practices
regulating sex roles should be viewed as a concerted response to the
market failure that results from the positive externalities of caring for
children. Although a free market for women's labor would appear to be
efficient, that appearance is fundamentally mistaken. Uncompensated
benefits to third parties potentially interfere with efficient allocations of
labor on an unregulated market.
This is not to say that there are no possible alternative accounts of
how women have found themselves providing valuable services for
inadequate compensation or without monetary compensation of any kind.
One explanation is a variation on pure rent-seeking. Men have banded
together to use collective force to extract value from women on behalf of
themselves and children, but not necessarily within an arrangement that is
socially efficient. But why would societies that indulge such inefficiencies
survive and thrive? Alternatively, specialization creates compensating
advantages that might be efficient. 46 But then why haven't societies simply
45
See Wax, supra note 31. For example, societies develop "dual labor markets" in which
women are artificially confined, by custom and practice, to a limited number of occupations; ordain
price discrimination in the form of lower wages for women, regardless of productivity; create a
marriage bar, which drastically raises the price (forgoing marriage) of staying in the paid labor market;
and create a taboo that views a working wife as a badge of shame. For a more extensive discussion of
gender role norms, see id.
46
See Gary S. Becker, Human Capital. Effort. and 1/ze Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB.
ECON S33-S58 ( 1985).
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chosen to bribe women to adopt roles that lead to the most socially
efficient result, rather than restricting the choices they are permitted to
make, thus incurring the costs of blocking voluntary utility-enhancing
transactions? 47 The final alternative looks to externalities . Restrictive
gender customs serve to shift incentives to correct for spontaneous
undersupply. Thus, what some have suspected all along is confirmed:
societies have devised ways to force women to sacrifice for the greater
good. 48 Although the externalities of parenting and childrearing are elusive
and difficult to measure, this story has the virtue of explaining the
universality, perdurability, and remarkable stability of gender role
49
restrictions.
In sum, what Burggraf misses is the possibility that the gender caste
system she criticizes is not the source of the undercompensation of caring
work, but rather has evolved as a response to it. She blames the domestic
confinement of women under a gender caste system for undervaluing
traditional nurturing activities: If only women's services were fully priced,
women would be paid what they are worth and the undersupply problem
would disappear. But a moment's reflection shows what is wrong with that
story: Giving women fewer alternatives would be expected to increase the
supply of nurturing services, not decrease it, by lowering the opportunity
cost of engaging in those activities and by decreasing the rewards of
alternative efforts. The market is the source, not the solution, for the
undervaluation and underprovision of childrearing. And the ideology of
the gender caste system merely reflects and rationalizes the market failures
that make it necessary.
B.

Will a Parental Dividend Solve Undersupply ?

The question of whether an adequate supply of parental time with
children would be realized under the baseline conditions of a free, genderblind market for wage labor is of vital importance in evaluating Burggraf's
proposal for Social Security reform. Although Burggraf is concerned with
the full range of parental investments in children, she clearly views direct
parental care as a key guarantor of children's healthy and productive
futures. But Burggraf's parental dividend program will make a significant
47
For a di sc ussion of these alternatives, see Wax, supra note 31.
48
To a lesser extent , men (in their role as fathers) ha ve been forced to sacrifice as well. A
parallel story could be told about the benefits extracted from men in favor of children and society by
customs restricting men's marital choices and sexual fre edom. Those mores have proven as universal ,
stable, and perdurabl e as gender restrictions.
It does not begin to expl ain , however, ho w such gender ro le conventions ac tually came to
49
be de veloped and adopted- tha t is, it explains their rationale but not the steps in their genesi s. For a
general discussion of the origin of norms (and ge nde r role norms in particular), see McAdams, supra
note 41 , at 379 & n. l41.
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difference in the supply of the parental services she deems vital only if
Social Security is responsible for a significant portion of the downward
pressure on those efforts. Even if Social Security were abolished altogether
and the externalized component of support for childless contemporaries
disappeared , it would not follow that more mothers would stay home or
that parents would cut back their hours at work. Declaring a parental
dividend, although it may return some resources to parents, does nothing
to address the principal sources of the rising opportunity costs of bearing
and raising children. Likewise, that reform will not bring back the social
and sexual norms concerning divorce, adultery, premarital cohabitation,
and serial monogamy that served as important bulwarks against the erosion
of continuing paternal investment in children by stabilizing two-parent
families and by facilitating the division of labor that permitted women to
50
devote time to caretaking.
Even if Social Security may slightly
exacerbate the shortages that the liberalization of norms has caused,
reforming that system as Burggraf suggests will neither reverse these
developments nor address their root causes. Indeed, Burggrafs conclusion
that the exploding opportunity cost of childrearing has exacerbated a crisis
that can be laid at the feet of a perverse old-age pension system almost
certainly gets the relationship backwards. The old-age pension system has
come to function as the principal backstop against a shortage in parental
investment that can be traced back to the social changes associated with
the triumph of feminism and the sexual revolution. Although the economic
developments that have resulted in the liberation of women have unleashed
the very changes, including most notably demographic implosion in
advanced industrial countries, that have threatened the Social Security
51
system with collapse, those forces are the outgrowth neither of that
program's creation nor of its peculiar design. It follows that Social
Security reform cannot plausibly function as the principal agent of
restoring the family to its prior place of cultural and social primacy or of
elevating children's level of well-being to some better or higher level that
presumably prevailed in the past.
The cogency of Burggrafs particular proposal is especially doubtful
because its sole focus is on the privatization of returns , rather than the
socialization of costs. It thus addresses itself to, at best, half of the
problem. The potentially troublesome and market-failure-inducing
50
Burggraf does discuss di vorce reform as one component of a comprehensive program to
stabi li ze the family . See BURGGRAF, supra note I, at 109-44. For example, she suggests including
earnin g capaci ty in the marital property that is di vided between spouses upon the d issolution of
marriage. See id. at 136. Her discuss ion of famil y stabilit y, ho weve r, includes a very hea vy emphas is
on changing the way in wh ich fa mily resources are all ocated fo r old-age support . See id. at 138-39.
51
See generally PETER G. PETERSON , WIL L AM ERICAN GROW UP BEFORE IT GROWS OLD 'l
HOW THE COMING SOC IA L SECURJTY CRIS IS TH REATE NS YOU, YOUR FAMILY, AND YOUR COUNTRY

(1996).
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externalities from hands-on caring work and other forms of onerous
parental investment fall into two distinct categories: the purely altruistic
benefits to children for which parents, by definition, receive no
recompense; and the dispersed and generalized social benefits from the
rearing of industrious, upstanding citizens, which take the form mainly
(although not solely) of public goods. The proper corrective for each type
of potentially market-distorting externality is not the same. Burggraf's
solution to both problems is, in effect, to accomplish the privatization of
old-age security 52 by closing the circle of family interdependence that is
breached by the structural barriers that impede efficient, spontaneous
transactions between contiguous generations. Burggraf suggests that if
parents are forced to look to their own children as a hedge against
destitution and abandonment, they will have an important incentive to
invest wisely in their children's upbringing. 53 In effect, the benefits
externalized to children will be internalized to the investor. But that effect
addresses only that portion of the undersupply and undercompensation
problem that can be traced to uncompensated gifts to the next generation.
(And the parental dividend is a far from perfect solution even to that aspect
of the problem. 54 ) It does not touch the socialized portion of the
undersupply, which may be built into the very nature of the childrearing
function itself. Although the parental dividend will produce a larger
payback from benefits flowing to individual parents' own children, some
portion of uncompensated benefits will still go to society as a whole. The
conditions for a free ride on a public good will still persist.
In sum, the skyrocketing opportunity cost of having and supporting
children that has followed the collapse of the gender caste system is the
prime suspect in any attempt to explain a decline in investments in the next
generation. Those shifts in norms and social practices have had their main
impact on the reproductive choices and attitudes of women. Added to that
are the loosening restrictions on sexual adventurism, divorce, and serial
monogamy- developments which have greatly increased the opportunity
costs of hewing to the stable arrangements that arguably provide the best
52
There has been much talk of various proposals to privatize Social Security. The essence
of most privatization proposals is a plan to substitute investments in private capital markets
(specifically, the stock market) for the maintenance by the govemmment of a pool of funds for
payment of liabilities incurred under the terms of the program. Under some proposals, the government
would manage the private investment of an aggregative fund into which beneficiaries would pay a
mandated amount. See Peter Diamond, Sound Investment, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 1998 , at 18 . Other
proposals contain an additional element of privati zation, in that each recipient would be permitted to
maintain a persona l fund , whic h he or she would manage under loose regulatory guidelines. The latter
programs effectively aboli sh the progressively redi stributive elemen t currently built into the program,
and undem1ine the el emen t of insurance against indi viduali zed risk of bad inves tmen ts that is inherent
in the pooled manage ment of funds. See .Jonathan Chait, Security Risk, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 18, 1999,
at 20.
53
See BURGGRAF , supra note i, at 69-85.
5..:\
See infra Part IV .
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setting for bringing up children and producing lots of them. Whether the
behavioral shifts induced by these phenomena swamp those created by
Social Security's guarantee of freedom from an insecure old age is
ultimately an empirical question. But if the effects of the collapse of the
sexual and labor market cartels are greater than the effects of the modern
erosion of the intergenerational compact-which they almost certainly
are-then moving to a parental dividend will not change the level of
parental investment very much.
III. Indulging the Nurture Assumption
As noted above, Burggrafs parental dividend proposal falls short by
failing adequately to address the component of external benefit from
childrearing that is broadly socialized-a component that is difficult to
quantify but that evidence suggests may be substantial. At best, her
proposal is designed to address the effects of benefits conferred on the
particular children who have received parental care. But even as an attempt
to internalize the externality traceable to uncompensated parental gifts, the
proposal is seriously flawed. Despite our commonsense notions about the
relationship between good parenting and positive outcomes for children, it
is difficult to identify and measure the benefits or payoffs of all forms of
parental investments in children, including direct parental care, because
the causal links are not well established. The proposition that there is some
regular correspondence between the inputs and outputs of childrearing has
tremendous appeal and is almost certainly true at the extremes, but
demonstrating the importance of small shifts in the quantity and quality of
parental investment or behavior over most of the range ordinarily found
within modem industrial societies is quite problematic. Even more difficult
is the task of demonstrating a correlation between socially significant
differences in outcomes and the amount of direct parental care as
compared to care by paid surrogates.55 Thus, gender role nonns that force
or encourage mothers to care for their own offspring may not be necessary
to provide for the optimal care of children. If paid caretakers could
potentially do just as well, attention should shift away from strategies for
luring women back into the home and towards trying to alter daycare
purchase decisions or to improve the quality of paid childcare .56
55
See. e.g., Michael Lamb, Nonparental Child Care: Context. Quality, Co rrelates, and
Consequences, in 4 HA NDB OOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: CH ILD PSYCHOLOGY IN PRACT ICE (W illiam
Damon et al. eds. , 1997) (d iscussing equ ivocal soc ial sc ience ev idence on the e ffects of nonparental
childcare and pa id chi ldca re services); SUSAN OIIRA, A MOTH ER'S PL ACE: CHOOSING WORK AND
FAMILY WIT HOUT GUlL T OR BLAME ( 1999) (citing Michael Lamb and discussing the effects of
chil dcare) .
56
See, e.g., Al ison Blau & David Hagy, The Demand for Quality in Child Care, 106 J. POL.
E CO~ 104 ( 1993) (sugg~s ting that parents are not very interested in trading up to more expensive
childcare). That is not to say that the pote nt ial equ ivale nce of pa id and parental care for many of a
ch il d' s wa king hours necessari ly makes the potential problem of inadequate parenta l in vest ment in
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Burggrafs discussion of the caring crisis and her proposal for
creation of a parental dividend, rests on a fundamental premise about the
role of parents in their children's lives. If the premise is invalid, her
argument loses much of its cogency and force. The mere content of
Burggrafs proposal makes clear that she adopts some version of what
psychologist Judith Harris has recently called the "nurture assumption":
because parents provide the environment in which children grow up,
parents have "a real power over the sort of people their children will tum
57
out to be."
The nurture assumption can be unpacked into a sequence of
understandings about child development, the role of parents, and the
efficacy of public policy in influencing outcomes for children. First, there
exists a regular, systematic, and demonstrable causal relationship between
the choices that parents make in rearing their children and how those
children tum out as adults. It is therefore possible to develop something
like a science of childrearing, which rests on the discovery of the rules
linking parental conduct to results. That science can be harnessed to guide
parental behavior. Second, the behavior of a child's individual parents is
the most important factor in how that child develops. This is an
assumption about the relative magnitude of effects, based on a belief that
parents have a greater role in influencing a child's development than
countless other factors, including what children watch on television; the
mores of friends or peers; the presence, number, and character of siblings;
the educational philosophy of the child's school; heredity; or even luck.
Third, children' s character, behavior, skills, personality, and ability are
within parents' deliberate control. They are not simply a matter of fixed
traits or background characteristics that parents bring to the childrearing
role. Thus, parents can determine whether their children's future behavior
will be socially desirable or undesirable, socially constructive or
destructive. Fourth, because child development is a function of parents'
chosen conduct, public policy can influence parental behavior to produce
better outcomes for children by bringing to bear the right incentives and by
providing parents with the proper resources .
The failure of any of these assumptions casts serious doubt on
Burggrafs proposal and on any broader investment model that depends on
the existence of a systematic and predictable causal relationship between
parental investments and the development of children's human capital. Yet
there is reason to question the tenets of this model. By claiming to show
that the causal links between certain kinds of inputs and outputs in the
childrearing game are not well established, the psychologist Judith Harris
casts doubt on the conclusion that parents can control or minimize the risks
children go away. Rather, it would onl y shift the debate to whether the supposed externaliti es of
childrearing would lead wage earning parents to skimp on the quality of the childcare services that they
purchase fo r their ch il dren .
57

JU DITH HARRIS, TH E N URTURE AS SU t\IPTI ON 2 ( 1998) .
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of bad outcomes by adopting certain investment strategies. 58 Although
there is a high degree of correlation between certain parental
characteristics and children's traits and behavior, there is a remarkable
paucity of data to distinguish between correlations due to fixed traits (such
as heredity) or linked circumstances (such as intelligent peers and parental
education), and the direct effects of parents' childrearing strategies. The
principal factors that determine child outcomes are either unknown
because we are as yet ignorant of the causal rules, or not under parents'
control because independent of parents' deliberate childrearing choices.
Burggraf s parental dividend scheme necessarily envisions parents making
childrearing decisions that will result in monetary payoffs that are
correlated systematically with the value of the resources expended. This
will happen only if more or better parental investment tends to increase the
value of the parental dividend fund, which in tum will occur only if certain
conditions hold. First, proper parental inputs will tend to create more
productive citizens. Those citizens will earn higher incomes and pay more
money into parents' retirement accounts. Second, parents must know
which kinds of investments produce this effect. They must believe, for
example, that if they supervise their children more conscientiously, read to
them, teach them, play with them, take them to museums and on camping
trips, eschew long work hours and excessive careerism, banish selfishness,
and renounce serial monogamy and sexual adventurism, their children will
reward them with higher incomes in the future. Thus, parents must
explicitly or implicitly embrace the "nature assumption." And that
assumption must be correct.
Burggrafs behavioral predictions simply will not work if these
conditions do not hold or if any of the effects are swamped by other
factors. Even if there is a regular causal link between parental choices and
child outcomes, the signal of the parental dividend must be large enough to
rise above the noise of other elements, such as occupational or sexual
opportunity costs, or the magnitude of parents' consumption value relative
to investment value, that tend either to discourage or encourage
investments in children. And a causal relationship, even if present, does
not guarantee a large effect. The validity of the nurture assumption tells us
nothing about the elasticity of the investment-output relationship. Massive
increases in parental inputs may be necessary to produce rather small
improvements in future productivity. For these reasons, the effective
incentives the parental dividend creates for parents to improve the quality
or quantity of investment may be marginal at best.
In sum, the fundam ental problem with Burggrafs proposal is that
there is remarkably little evidence that, above and beyond insuring that a
minimum baseline of physical and emotional needs are met, parental
choices lead in any demonstrable way to the production of better or worse
5S

348

St> e id.

Is There a Caring Crisis?
children. 59 Moreover, economic success in the marketplace and the ability
to demand high pay is hardly the only measure of a successful adult or
child. An additional step is necessary to conclude that variations within the
normal range of parental behavior will reliably result in higher earnings, as
opposed to other outcomes that are socially valuable or desired by parents
and children.
As an attempt to bring an economic paradigm to the childrearing
function, the human capital investment framework is not necessarily a
mistake . The model may lead us astray, however, by implying a degree of
control and predictability that is belied by our poor understanding of the
principals of child development and by the facts. That predictability is
essential if Burggrafs parental dividend proposal is to have any chance of
making a significant difference in the live s of children. For even if, as
Burggraf predicts, parents really will invest more in children in
anticipation of greater returns on their investment through the parental
dividend device, that expectation will not be fulfilled unless parents' belief
in the efficacy oftheir own enhanced contribution is grounded in reality.
IV. The Nurture Assumption and the Risks of Childrearing
Burggrafs parental dividend proposal implicitly assumes that
childrearing can be made a low-risk undertaking by establishing a structure
that requires children to support their own parents. But if childrearing is
inherently a high-risk proposition, that assumption fails. Indeed, the
foregoing discussion suggests that investments in children may be among
the riskiest that a person can choose to make . There is no guarantee,
despite best efforts, that children will tum out well rather than badly. They
may grow up to be incompetent or ineffectual, or may die, fall sick, go
insane, or run afoul of the law. Even if children are capable of supporting
their elderly parents, they may refuse to do so out of ingratitude or coldheartedness , or simply because they insist upon following a life plan (as a
starving artist, perhaps) that is incompatible with providing much help.
Attempts to solve this problem by contractual mechanisms face "first
mover" problems and other structural impediments created by the time lag
between investment and payoff and by contractual incapacity due to
children ' s immaturity during the period when the most intensive parental
investments must be made. Societies have attempted to cope with the risk
of contractual failure through various informal mechanisms, including
strong norms of filial duty and obligations of parental support in old age.
However, those norms were never a perfect guarantee against bad luck and
defiant ingratitude and have succumbed in part to modem conditions.
Indeed, the rise of governmentally mandated old-age programs and their
59

See id, at 44.
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ascendant political popularity almost certainly can be traced in part to the
erosion of conventions that helped parents secure their children's future
60
support.
The notion that childrearing is a highly risky endeavor bears on why
old-age insurance is considered so valuable and on whether Burggrafs
proposal is a good substitute for what we already have. Social Security
may best be understood not as a general form of insurance against
destitution in old age, but as a hedge against the failures of our investments
in children. In other words, Social Security's principal function is to
protect us against the risk that, despite best efforts, we will be left bereft by
61
selfish, ungrateful, or incompetent offspring. If the nurture assumption is
largely illusory, there may be no other way effectively to insure against
that risk except having no children at all and deflecting our resources
elsewhere.
Burggrafs proposal provides the worst of insurance worlds by
making one type of insurance mandatory (thus limiting substitution away
to various options that are more responsive to individual circumstances
and risk averseness) while failing to insure against the most intransigent
risk of all. The program leaves parents completely vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of child outcomes, against which they may need and want
protection. 62 Assuming that little can be done to reduce the risk that
parents' investments in children will go bad, the parental dividend's failure
to mitigate those risks may in some cases have the perverse effects of
discouraging childbearing or causing parents to shunt resources away from
existing children in favor of alternative investment strategies, such as
retirement accounts, that are more likely to yield a reliable return.
Moreover, the very same intransigence that makes insurance against the
risks inherent in parenthood so valuable would also serve as a hedge
against any moral hazard from protecting parents against the consequences
of producing bad children. If the nurture assumption has little bite over the
range of behaviors at issue-if there is no systematic and reliable
relationship between parental investments beyond the decent minimum
and children's future productivity or pathology-it is hard to see why
society has much practical interest in blocking the formation of a pooled
insurance fund that allows members of a generation to draw against the
60
It has bee n argued, however, that the causation runs in the other direction; that is to say,
tha t Soc ial Security has helped to erode those conventi ons. See, e.g., DAVID FRUM, DEAD RIGHT 19394 ( 1994 ): Jenn ifer Roback Morse , Chopping the Family Tree, FORBES, Oct. 5, 1998, at 86.
61
For a di scuss ion of the difficulties that could be expected to attend the de velopment of
huma n cap1 tal marke ts across gen erati ons (includin g ri sks inherent in the time lag, the problem of the
in ab ility to contra ct due to the immaturity of children, and the risk inherent in the vicissitudes of the
outcomes of chil drca rin g) , see Wa x, supra note 31.
62
Burggraf does sugges t the creati on of a means-tested subsistence benefit program for the
child less or for parents whose offs pring fai l them co mpletely. See BURGGRA F, supra note 1, at 80-81.
But th:~ t pmgra m is intended to be de minim us under her sc heme.
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efforts of others.
Even if Social Security induces some marginal
disinvestment in children due to diminished parental concern about how
their children will tum out, this behavior may nevertheless produce little
systematic effect on overall social well-being. The premise of moral
hazard is that behavioral incentives affect behavior and that behavior
makes a difference . In the case of parent-child relations, that difference
may not hold, or the relationship may simply be too weak to matter.
V.

Other Benefits of Social Security Foregone

In addition to sacrificing much-prized insurance against lack of
effective control over child outcomes, Burggrafs program fails to deliver
other valuable benefits of the Social Security program as currently
structured. Socialized pension benefits provide independence that is
precious to children and parents alike. Mutual dependence, whatever its
potential payoffs, entails a distinctive sacrifice of freedom, and freedom is
valuable in itself. Social Security has not meant that children need not
worry about their parents nor parents about their children. But neither
parents nor children need worry nearly so much. This freedom permits
children to make choices or develop life plans that are fundamentally
incompatible with primary responsibility for their aged parents' well-being
64
Likewise, parents are less concerned about their
and livelihood.
children' s economic fate or about maintaining amicable relations with
them. To be sure, Burggrafs proposal potentially mitigates parents '
concern with staying on their children's good side by mandating financial
support out of children's own earnings. Parents will nonetheless still retain
a strong interest in controlling economic aspects of their grown children's
lives and will be tempted to push children into jobs or careers with bigger
monetary payoffs in the market, regardless of talents or interests. But it is
precisely from the incentive to force children into a course that will not
promote their happiness that parents might wish to be free. Parents may
63

As Kenn eth Abraham has observed:

Few people in our society object, on grounds of fairness, that the amount of risk distribution
peopl e choose to have through private insurance is excessive. No one thinks it is unfair or
immoral that peo ple do not have to bear all the risks of their activities. If we are ever concerned
tha t people have chosen to share risk excessively, our concerns are grounded in reasons of
effic iency and loss preve nti on. Our society worri es li ttle if at all that we tamper with fate by
purchasing insuranc e coverage.
KENNETH S Al3RAHA\I, DISTRIB UT ING RI SK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLI C POLICY 18

(1986).
(J'l
For a sensitive discu ss ion of this point and othe rs pertinent to the mr.dcm we lfare slate's
balance between independence and conn e<: t e dne~;s, see Jeremy Waldron , IVhcn Justice Replaces
Affection. The Nccrlfor l?igh:s, in 'N,\LDR mJ, LiflERj\L RIGHTS ( 1993).
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prefer their children to pursue their own interests and therefore would not
wish to participate in a system that might strengthen incentives to frustrate
that preference. A socialized system of old-age support allows parents to
confer the gift of disinterest in their children's choice of career. That
benefit may be lost if Burggraf s parental dividend proposal is adopted.
The same point applies to the effect the parental dividend is likely to
have on such social practices as children taking the time to " find
themselves" by prolonging their education, engaging in extensive travel or
leisurely pursuits, or hopping from job to job. Some young people may be
more reluctant to engage in these strategies for fear of depriving their
parents. It is more likely, however, that parents will respond to the
financial incentive to nag, steer, or pressure their children prematurely into
moneymaking endeavors. In addition to sacrificing children's (and
parents ') consumption value from alternative pursuits, this steering (if
effective) may be inefficient in the long run. The imperative to hurry up
and make money may result in an inferior match of people and
65
employment.
Burggrafs proposal is also problematic in its unavoidable emphasis
on the monetary value of children's activities. The proposal selectively
recognizes only the element of parental work or investment that generates
monetary returns, because the parental dividend fund necessarily contains
only cash. Moreover, the monetary returns must take the form of taxable
earnings or income to the child, which in itself raises the specter of asset
shuffling and sheltering galore. That Burggrafs proposal takes account
only of pecuniary returns has a number of paradoxical and perverse
consequences. First, the job market may feel some effects. Well paying
positions will attract even more applicants. Jobs that pay less will see a
drop in the supply of well trained and capable workers. That result may
well add to the devaluation of traditional female functions. It is ironic that
low paying jobs, which often tend to be associated with femininity and
caretaking roles, may go begging under a proposal that seeks to reward the
type of "women's work" that is claimed to be undercompensated,
underappreciated, or denigrated under current arrangements.
This effect will find its most extreme expression in parents' likely
attitude towards children who elect to stay out of the labor market
altogether in favor of full-time caretaking. Those children will, of course,
be disproportionately female. Since full-time mothers and homemakers
will pay nothing into the parental dividend fund, parents cannot be
expected to look with customary equanimity upon this option for their
65
See. e.g., J. Houl t Verkerke , Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U.
L REV 115, 11 7 n. 7 (re viewi ng studies suggest ing that some degree of job change: and employee
tumover, by o\\owing workers "to sea rch fol" another job that better matches their ab ilitie s," helps to
"pl"omo tc[] e!'lic icncy" in JOb markets)
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daughters. The penalty that parents of caretaking children can expect to
pay may have a number of consequences. First, parents will come to favor
sons over daughter more than they perhaps already do. Women tend to
earn less than men of similar age and education. Therefore, sons' expected
earnings and expected contribution to any parental dividend fund will as a
general matter be greater than daughters' regardless of whether daughters
take on caretaking roles. But daughters' tendency to sacrifice paid work to
domestic activities will also undermine their projected contributions to the
dividend fund and their value in parents' eyes. All these factors might
encourage parents to invest more heavily in their sons' education or to
favor their male offspring in other ways.
Thus, parental preference will add to whatever pressure already exists
on women to favor paid over unpaid domestic work. A program that starts
out with the objective of rewarding and encouraging traditional women's
work will have the effect of discouraging the very activities it seeks to
promote. Even more unfortunately, the parental dividend will enhance the
conflicts women already feel from the need to function as both
breadwinner and caretaker by pitting a woman's interest in investing in her
own children (who will eventually pay into her parental dividend fund)
against her parents' pressure on her to go out and earn a living (and pay
more money into theirs). Women's parents will want them working early
and often, but the daughters' own self-interest will dictate bearing children
and caring for them reasonably well. This bind will be especially acute for
single mothers, who are already buckling under the pressure of the
conflicting demands of their various roles.
Burggraf appears to recognize this problem, but her proposed solution
raises as many difficulties as it cures. On the theory that "parents who
produce a family caretaker contribute as much to the next generation's
reproductive success as do parents who produce a family breadwinner,"
Burggraf suggests that married couples contribute an equal amount, based
on the unit's total income, into funds for both spouse's parents, thus
charging the breadwinner in a traditional family with support for two sets
of parents. 66 Burggraf sees this "split dividend" as parallel to proposals for
reforming Social Security through the creation of "personal security
accounts," whereby family wage earners contribute an amount prorated to
half of total family income to earnings accounts earmarked separately for
husband and wife .67 But the drawbacks of the split dividend parallel some
66
Burggraf states that "[i]f Social Security were converted to a parental dividend, taxes
should be based on a couple's joint return and the dividends distributed equally between the parents of
husband and wife." BUGGRAF, supra note l, at 130.
67
See id. These accounts have been proposed as a more equitable alternative to the current
system, which designates the noneaming or lower-earning spouse as a secondary beneficiary on the
breadwinner's account. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social
Security , and SiOne, Seidman. Sunstein & Tushnet 's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUiV!. L. REV. 264, 286
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of the difficulties inherent in the transition to personal security accounts
based on income splitting within the current system. As compared to
making each spouse responsible for his or her own parents, this
arrangement greatly enhances men's premium on remaining single. Put
another way, the arrangement tends to discourage marriage by adding to
the burden of married men relative to single ones. Yet this effect
potentially runs contrary to Burggraf s goal of achieving greater
investments in children. Those investments depend on men's willingness
to get married and stay married. Burdening breadwinners with the old-age
support of two sets of parents potentialiy undermines both effects.
Burggraf's proposal may also have unintended costs by creating incentives
for parents to meddl·.~ perversely in their children ' s marital choices.
Parents' ironclad control over their children 's rnatches is a cardina l fe ature
of closed, traditional societies. The temptation to exerc ise such contTol is
irresistible when children are charged with the support of aging parents,
since the economic fate of the children's family unit and the integrity of
their marriage bears directly on how their parents will fare. But that
control creates a contlict of interest between parents and children that has
produced much human misery. In general, the greater share of unhappiness
from parental control over marital choices has fallen on women, who
would bear the brunt under the parental dividend scheme as well. Because
men generally have superior labor market prospects, parents will be far
more interested in the marital choices of their daughters than their sons and
will bring greater pressure to bear on females to make a potentially
lucrative or prudent match. Parents could also be expected to mount more
opposition to their daughters' divorces than their sons', since divorce
might terminate , or at least attenuate, the son-in-law's obligation to pay
into in-laws' parental dividend fund. 68 Moreover, the incentives would
work in the opposite direction for sons. Parents might do better if their
sons delayed marriage and childbearing, because all the sons' earnings
contributions would be earmarked for the parents' fund alone and would
not have to be shared with the parents of a caretaking spouse. Once again,
the effects may perversely impede family formation and heap
disadvantages on women by virtue of their caretaking function.
Finally, Burggraf's proposal dramatically attenuates the redistributive
component of the existing Social Security system, leaving behind only the
intergenerational portion of that effect. A number of elements of
( 1989) (d isc uss in g an earnings shari ng proposal ); Karen Holden, Social Securi1y and the Econo111ic
Security of Wo men.· Is II Fair 7 , in SOC!AI. SECU RITY , supra no te ll , a t 91.
68
Burrgra i' suggests at one poi nt that the ob li gation to pa y in to the fund of a fo rme r 'pouse's
parents should survi vt: divo rce. See B URGG R.'\F. supm no te l , at 1.3 7-39. But if the contrib ution to an
ex-spouse were :tdj usted to rake into account any obligations to a new wife or· depcnd:mts or the new
wife" s pa ren ts, the paren ts oi' ex-spouses could po tentia ll y sufkr or the ir stake wou ld app•2a r less
sec ure.
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redistribution will be lost if Burggraf's system is adopted. As already
noted, by exposing parents to the risk of child failure, Burggraf's proposal
would enhance the value of the omnipresent option to remain childless and
to invest the money that would otherwise be spent on children elsewhere.
Indeed, Burggraf acknowledges that, although the parental dividend might
affect the behavior of people who have already decided how many
children to have, it can do little to encourage childbearing: "compared to
the financial advantages of remaining childless, a parental dividend of any
imaginable size would be very small change." 69
The importance of the "opt out" as an end run around the parental
dividend may well differ by social class, however. Foregoing childbearing
carries costs in the form of the lost consumption value, or satisfaction, that
parents take in their children. The poor might prefer to invest in children
because they have fewer alternative consumption opportunities. Also, it is
more difficult for those with low income to save, regardless of whether
they have children. At best, they face enormous practical obstacles to
putting money away against the future. Consequently, children have
always been an important and often exclusive form of investment for
70
persons of low income. In contrast, wealthy parents can often afford to
devote resources to other valuable investments yielding future returns. In
other words, the well-off are in the position to diversify their investments
as a hedge against risk. By exposing the poor differentially to an important
form of investment risk from which they can otherwise obtain little
protection, the proposal would have a potentially regressive effect.
Burggraf seems strangely indifferent to additional distributive effects
of her proposal. Low-income workers would also probably be worse off
under a parental dividend scheme than under the current arrangement for
two additional reasons. First, the parental dividend abolishes a feature of
the current program that gives individuals at the bottom of the earnings
scale a far greater rate of return than higher income recipients on earnings
contributions .71 Indeed, in this respect, the current program effec tive ly
incorporates a subsidy running from high earners to low earners, which
functions to offset the regressivity of the fixed percentage employment tax
(FICA). By making each family circle responsible for supporting its own,
Burggraf s plan shares a cardinal feature of the more extreme proposals for
privatization: It abolishes the redistribution from rich to poor that is only
made possible by pooling contributions across beneficiaries of different
social classes and establishing a progressive benefits schedule.
Second, Burggraf's proposal entrenches the economic inequa lities
69
70
71
privatization

!d. at 206.
See ld. at 79-80.
See LEVITAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 1-63; Chai t, supra note 54 (noting how so me
proposals nullify the progressively redistributive effec ts of the current program ).
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that are persistently transmitted from generation to generation. The
children of the poor and lower-middle class, upon reaching adulthood, are
far more likely to gravitate towards the lower end of the earnings scale
than the children of the upper-middle class. In addition, wholesale child
failure, in the form of criminality, drug addiction, or early death, is likely
to be more common among the poor. It is unclear whether these patterns
are caused by lower quality or quantity of investment on the part of
individual lower-income parents or by less immediately pliable factors
such as background conditions or fixed traits. But even if the causes of
class immobility are potentially amenable to incentive effects, there is no
reason to believe that the incentives created by the parental dividend
proposal will significantly alter the tendency of low-income parents to
produce low-income children. We know almost nothing about what
parents need to do to transform lower-middle class children into middle
class and upper-middle class adults. Even if we did, it is not clear that a
mere change in the design of Social Security would induce less fortunate
parents to do those very things. That the parental dividend would probably
do little to promote social mobility means that poor parents will receive
significantly lower retirement benefits than more affluent parents, with
loss even of the modest mitigation inherent in the current program.
The relatively regressive effects of the parental dividend would, once
again, be particularly hard on single mothers, who tend to be concentrated
at the bottom end of the income scale and thus currently receive among the
highest rate of return on their defined contributions. Burggraf's proposal
already disfavors single mothers by effectively charging them both with
the support of their own parents in old age and with the costs of bringing
up their own children. Once again , the current system socializes some of
those costs through redistribution across income classes. That feature
would be abruptly terminated under Burggraf's proposal. Poor women
would support poor parents and bring up poor children who would likely
tum into relatively poor adults. Those poor children would in tum be
charged with their own poor parents' support.
Conclusion
The parental dividend proposal, by understandably focusing for
simplicity's sake on relations between two generations within each family,
takes too narrow a view. Its parochialism is both horizontal and vertical
because it ignores important distributive issues among successive
generations and among parents and children across families from different
economic and social classes. An analysis that extends beyond two
generations reveals that the parental dividend proposal does not end the
tug of war between successive generations or reconcile their interests. Nor

356

Is There a Caring Crisis?
can it. By making the adult working population responsible for supporting
both the elderly and the younger generation, Burggrafs proposal does not
fundamentally alter the character of generous, pay-as-you-go old-age
support in an era of declining fertility. Such a scheme will necessarily
function as a zero- or negative-sum game whereby the cunent generation's
parents and children can only win at each other's expense. That conflict is
not peculiar to the parental dividend. It is an inevitable feature of all
societies in which population and total productivity do not march
inexorably upward. Perhaps that conflict can be resolved only by
subordinating the interests of the elderly to a collective duty towards
generations yet unborn. But we have all but abandoned the customary
expectation, which held sway for thousands of years, that the elderly will
sacrifice for the young. That abandonment is evident in our fertility rates,
our attitudes towards childbearing, and in the design of our old-age
pension scheme.
Burggrafs proposal likewise represents an inadequate fix for the
undervaluation of off-market, caretaking work, or for any underprovision
for children in general. On the contrary, by putting the force of a
politically powerful group-the elderly-behind market work, and setting
it against a politically powerless group--children-that stands to benefit
most from some parents refraining from careerism or high levels of paid
employment, Burggraf has created a program that will lead society to pay
even less attention to children than it now does. This consequence,
perverse and unintended though it may be, can be traced to a fundamental
feature of Burggrafs proposal, which insists upon cashing out the social
value of the caretaker's investment in market terms. Parents and caretakers
invest in human capital. For Burggraf, human capital must prove itself in
the market. Any element of value or investment payoff that fails to convert
into earnings simply drops from the equation and is conveniently
forgotten. But then what becomes of the ongoing need to invest in future
generations? The family is not a closed circle, but a chain, in which the
investment process takes place largely outside the marketplace and never
entirely crosses over. Some portion of value and human effort always
remains on the nonmarket side, never to be fully assessed in terms of its
pecuniary currency. In trying to capture that element for one generation
only, Burggraf has broken the never ending chain. In the process she has
dropped some important links.
One alternative to the dilemma posed by the persistence of human
capital production outside the marketplace may be to tr; to close down the
non-market sector or at least drastically reduce its scope . The economist
Barbara Bergmann has recentiy recognized the dilemmas posed by the
permanent existence of a nonmarket, direct-exchange economy and has
proposed to solve the problem by, in effect, abolishing or dramatically
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shrinking that sector. Bergmann believes that as long as market and
nonmarket sectors are separately maintained, women's work will be
undervalued and women's efforts will not be adequately rewarded. Only if
traditional women's work is priced on a market along with other forms of
labor will its true value be revealed and prove less vulnerable to
manipulation. She therefore proposes unification of the market and
nonmarket sectors by moving to "a high degree of commodification of the
tasks that the present gender system assigns as unpaid duties to women." 73
But Bergmann's solution rests on a premise that Burggraf clearly does not
share: that nothing important will be lost by substituting services obtained
on the market for most unpaid services provided at home. Or perhaps
Bergmann does recognize the unique value of specific performance, but
would sacrifice that value added for her greater goal.
The contrast between these approaches of the two feminist
economists, Bergmann and Burggraf, is instructive. As radical as
Burggrafs scheme may appear to those who cherish the current program
of old-age support and resist its reform, the centerpiece of her plan is, after
all, a proposal to reform Social Security. Bergmann goes far beyond just
tinkering with social programs and legal rules for existing institutions. She
wishes to produce a fundamental and sweeping transformation of the key
facts of social life. In the end, Burggrafs book founders because it places
far too much weight on one policy device. This is not to deny that the
Social Security system is in jeopardy or that it needs reform. It surely is
and it surely does. But this need is largely traceable to the cultural and
social facts of modernity rather than to conditions created by the
peculiarities of the design of the program itself. Burggrafs prescription is,
alas, no antidote to what ails us, and may in fact leave us worse off.
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